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ABSTRACT
To help their users to discover important items at a particular time,
major websites like Twitter, Yelp, TripAdvisor or NYTimes provide
Top-K recommendations (e.g., 10 Trending Topics, Top 5 Hotels
in Paris or 10 Most Viewed News Stories), which rely on crowd-
sourced popularity signals to select the items. However, different
sections of a crowd may have different preferences, and there is
a large silent majority who do not explicitly express their opinion.
Also, the crowd often consists of actors like bots, spammers, or peo-
ple running orchestrated campaigns. Recommendation algorithms
today largely do not consider such nuances, hence are vulnerable
to strategic manipulation by small but hyper-active user groups.
To fairly aggregate the preferences of all users while recommend-
ing top-K items, we borrow ideas from prior research on social
choice theory, and identify a voting mechanism called Single Trans-
ferable Vote (STV) as having many of the fairness properties we
desire in top-K item (s)elections. We develop an innovative mecha-
nism to attribute preferences of silent majority which also make
STV completely operational. We show the generalizability of our
approach by implementing it on two different real-world datasets.
Through extensive experimentation and comparison with state-of-
the-art techniques, we show that our proposed approach provides
maximum user satisfaction, and cuts down drastically on items
disliked by most but hyper-actively promoted by a few users.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→ Recommender systems; •Human-
centered computing→ Social media;
KEYWORDS
Top-K Recommendation; Fair Representation; Twitter Trends; Most
Popular News; Fairness in Recommendation
1 INTRODUCTION
Many websites today are deploying top-K recommendations to help
their users find important items. For instance, social media sites like
Twitter recommend 10 ‘Trending Topics’ to let users know about
breaking news stories. Review aggregators like Yelp or TripAdvisor
show top 10 restaurants or hotels in a particular city. News websites
like CNN or NYTimes show 10 most viewed or most shared stories.
While some of these recommendations are personalized, i.e., tailored
to a particular user, others are non-personalized and the same items
are recommended to all users (at least in a geographical area).
Such recommendations implicitly rely on crowd-sourced pop-
ularity signals to select the items. Recently, concerns have been
raised about the potential for bias in such crowdsourced recom-
mendation algorithms [2]. For instance, Google’s search query au-
tocomplete feature has been criticized for favoring certain political
parties [38]. In another work [9], we showed that the majority of
Twitter trends are promoted by crowds whose demographics differ
significantly from Twitter’s overall user population, and certain
demographic groups (e.g., middle-aged black female) are severely
under-represented in the process.
In this paper, we propose to reimagine top-K non-personalized
crowdsourced recommendations (e.g., trending topics ormost viewed
news articles) as the outcomes of a multi-winner election that is pe-
riodically repeated. We show that the observed biases in top-K
recommendations can be attributed to the unfairness in the elec-
toral system. More specifically in Twitter, we observe that during
any single election cycle (5 to 15 minutes), (a) only a tiny fraction
(< 0.1%) of the overall user population express candidate (topics
or hashtag) preferences, i.e., a vast majority of voters are silent, (b)
some people vote multiple times, i.e., there is no one person, one vote
principle, and (c) voters choose from several thousands of potential
candidates (topics or hashtags), splitting their votes over several
moderate and reasonable topics, and thereby, allowing extreme top-
ics (representing highly biased view points) to be selected. Today’s
trending topic (s)election algorithms are vulnerable to electing such
fringe trends with as low as 0.001% of the electorate support.
To address the unfairness in item selections, we borrow ideas
from extensive prior research on social choice theory. We focus on
electoral mechanisms that attempt to ensure two types of fairness
criteria: proportional representation that requires the divisions in
(the topical interests of) the electorate to be reflected proportionally
in the elected body (i.e., selected items) and anti-plurality, where
an extremist candidate (item) highly disliked by a vast majority of
voters has little chance of getting (s)elected. We survey existing
literature and identify a voting mechanism Single Transferable Vote
(STV) as having the properties we desire in top-K item (s)elections.
However, implementing STV-based item selection poses a tech-
nical challenge: to deter strategic manipulation, STV requires every
user to provide a preference ranking over all candidates. Requiring
the website users to rank thousands of candidate items makes the
scheme impractical. We solve this challenge by proposing to auto-
matically infer the preference rankings for users. Fortunately, we
can leverage the rich existing literature on personalized recommen-
dations to rank items according to individual personal preferences
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of users. In fact, sites like Facebook and Twitter already use personal
preferences to order topics in users’ newsfeeds [30]. Additionally,
our approach enables us to account for (i.e., automatically infer
the ranking choices for) the large fraction of the electorate that is
otherwise silent and inactive during any election.
We demonstrate the practicality and effectiveness of our ideas
by conducting a comparative analysis of different mechanisms for
top-K recommendations using real-world data from social media
site Twitter and news media site Adressa. Over the course of a
month, we collected trending topics recommended by Twitter itself,
and computed in parallel the topics that would be recommended
by four different election mechanisms including plurality voting
(where the candidates with most first place votes win) and STV. At
a high-level, our findings demonstrate that trending topics elected
by STV are significantly less demographically biased than those
selected by both plurality-based voting schemes and Twitter itself.
At a lower-level, our analysis reveals how the improvement in STV
selected topics arise from STV’s fairness criteria of proportional
representation (which selects topics such that most users have at
least one of their highly preferred topics included in the elected set)
and anti-plurality (which rejects highly biased topics disliked by a
majority of users). We further evaluate the mechanisms for recom-
mending most popular Adressa news stories every day throughout
a two-months period, and make similar observations.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this paper:
(a) by mapping crowdsourced recommendations to multi-winner
elections, we show how the bias in recommendation can be traced
back to the unfairness in the electoral process; (b) we establish
the fairness properties desired in crowdsourced recommendations,
and identify an electoral method, STV, which ensures fair repre-
sentation in such contexts; (c) we implement STV by devising a
mechanism to provide equality of voice even to the users who are
otherwise silent during the election cycle. To the best of our knowl-
edge, ours is the first attempt to introduce fairness in crowdsourced
recommendations, and we hope that the work will be an important
addition to the growing literature on fairness, bias and transparency
of algorithmic decision making systems.
2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
As mentioned earlier, non-personalized top-K recommendations
in different websites rely on crowdsourced popularity signals to
select the contents. For example, Twitter recommends hashtags and
key-phrases as trending when their popularity among the crowds
exhibit a sudden spike [42]. Many news websites like NYTimes
(nytimes.com) or BBC (bbc.com/news) recommend stories that are
most read or most shared by their audience. Multiple recent works
have highlighted the potential for bias in such recommendations.
2.1 Biases in crowdsourced recommendations
Google’s search query autocomplete feature has been criticized as
favoring certain political parties [38], while concerns about political
biases in Facebook’s trending topic selection have led a fierce debate
about the need for human editorial oversight of the recommended
trends [31]. Interestingly, after Facebook removed the human edi-
tors who used to oversee the topics (popular among the crowds)
before they were recommended to the users [29], it was accused of
featuring fake news as trending [32]. In our earlier work [9], we
showed that the demographics of promoters of Twitter trends differ
significantly from Twitter’s overall user population, and certain de-
mographic groups are under-represented in the process. Similarly,
Baker et al. [3] found that the gender and racial stereotypes get
perpetuated in Google search auto complete suggestions.
Going beyond demographic bias, different types of actors (such
as spammers, trend hijackers or automated bots) disguise under the
umbrella term ‘crowd’. As crowdsourced algorithms are driven by
data generated by them, their outputs will reflect the biases in the
composition of the crowds. A recent investigation by Politico [27]
revealed that Twitter bots were largely responsible for the trend
#ReleaseTheMemo. Multiple works have also investigated the roles
of spammers and trend hijackers around Twitter trends [40, 45].
We hypothesize that one of the main reasons behind the bias
in crowdsourced recommendations is the lack of fair representa-
tion of various segments among the crowd considered in the algo-
rithms. Using the datasets described next, we attempt to specifically
identify the root causes behind the bias in the recommendations.
2.2 Datasets gathered
In this work, we consider two different recommendations: recom-
mendation of (i) trending topics, and (ii) most popular news stories.
(i) Trending Topics: Social media sites like Twitter recommend
a set of trending topics to help their users find happening events.
We gathered extensive data from Twitter during February to July,
2017. Throughout this 6 months period, we collected 1% sample of
all tweets posted in the US by applying the appropriate location
filters in the Twitter Streaming API [43]. In total, we collected
230M+ tweets posted by around 15 million US-based Twitter users
throughout this period. Simultaneously, by querying the Twitter
REST API [44] every 15-minutes during the month of July 2017, we
collected all topics which became trending in the US. During this
month, 10, 877 topics became trending, out of which 4, 367 were
hashtags and the rest were multi-word phrases. For simplicity, we
restrict our focus on trending hashtags in this paper.
(ii) Most Popular News: All major news websites recommend a
set of stories which are most popular (e.g., most read, most shared)
among the crowd. To consider such recommendations, we use the
‘Adressa News Dataset’ [18] which consists of the news reading be-
havior of around 3.1 million users on the Norwegian news website
Adresseavisen1 during the 3 months period from January, 2017 to
March, 2017. The dataset not only provides the information about
the stories read by every user (out of total 48, 486 news stories), but
also includes how much time a reader spent in each story. Using
these reading times as popularity signal, we simulate the recom-
mendation of 10 most read news stories every day.
2.3 Reimagining Top-K recommendation as a
multi-winner election
In this paper, we propose to see crowdsourced recommendation as the
result of an election, where the users vote for an item (e.g., a hashtag,
a news story) by tweeting, reading, or sharing it. We can think
of every x time interval as an election cycle (where x can be any
duration: 5 minutes, 1 hour, or 1 day), the topics or stories tweeted
(or read) in an interval as the candidates, and user activities during
1https://www.adressa.no, henceforth referred as ‘Adressa’
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Figure 1: (a) Percentage of all voters participating during different election cycles in Twitter. (b) Average number of votes
casted by different voters during an election. (c) Number of potential candidates for becoming trending during election cycles.
(d) Percentage of overall population needed to make different topics trending.
this interval serving as the ballots. The recommendation algorithm
can then be viewed as an election method which considers these
ballots and selects the winner items for recommendation. If only
one item is to be selected (i.e., K = 1), then it is a single winner
election. For K > 1, the corresponding election is multi-winner.
2.4 Unfair election biases selection of items
The mapping between top-K recommendation and multi-winner
election allows us to hypothesize that the bias in the recommended
items originates from a lack of fair representation in the underlying
election mechanism. More specifically, we identify a number of
potential root causes, as discussed next.
2.4.1 Not everyone votes in every election cycle.
Out of the thousands (or millions) of visitors to many websites, only
a small fraction of them actively participate during any particular
election cycle. For example, Figure 1(a) shows the percentage of
Twitter users in our dataset who participated in the trending topic
selection during different cycles throughout July, 2017. Although
there are around 15 Million Twitter users in our dataset (all of
whom are eligible voters), we can observe from Figure 1(a) that on
average, only 0.052% of them influence the trending topic selection.
Similarly, on average, only 4.54% of the Adressa readers read any
news on a given day. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a
large majority of website users who are silent during an election.
2.4.2 One person can cast multiple votes in an election.
Different voters participating in an election may have different
activity levels. For example, Figure 1(b) shows the average per-
centage of participating voters who cast different number of votes
during trending topic election in Twitter. We can see that only
35% of the voters vote once (i.e., use a single hashtag), and rest of
the voters either vote for different candidates (by using multiple
hashtags) or vote for same candidate multiple times. Although, we
do not know for sure whether Twitter’s Trending Topic selection
algorithm considers multiple votes from the same person, here
we highlight that it may be vulnerable to such multi-voting. We
see similar trends among Adressa readers, where there is a huge
variation in individual users’ reading activities.
2.4.3 Too many candidates to choose from.
In different websites today, the number of potential candidates for
recommendations is much more than a user can possibly notice.
News websites are producing hundreds of news stories everyday,
and news readers have very limited time and attention. The prob-
lem is more acute for social media – the amount of information
generated is a lot more, and a user will encounter only those coming
from her neighborhood, thus triggering a natural bias.
Figure 1(c) shows the number of candidate hashtags in Twitter
during any election cycle. On average, at least 3,000 candidates
compete to become trending in an election. Similarly, around 2,000
stories compete to become daily most popular news in Adressa.
2.4.4 % of voters needed to get an item selected is too low.
As only a small fraction of voters participate in any election and
their votes can get split across a large number of candidates, ef-
fectively a tiny fraction of overall user population can make an
item get (s)elected. For example, Figure 1(d) shows that most of the
Twitter trends enjoy the support of less than 0.001% of the overall
Twitter population. This makes the elections vulnerable to biased
and manipulated trends.
3 FAIRNESS CRITERIA FOR TOP-K
RECOMMENDATIONS
In this work, we express the process in which top-K recommenda-
tions are chosen through crowdsourcing as an election mechanism.
Extensive prior research in social choice theory have identified
several fairness criteria (properties) desired from the electoral sys-
tems [14, 37]. However, all fairness criteria are not applicable in a
given context. In Section 2.4, we identified the potential unfairness
in the electionmechanism that leads to bias in the crowdsourced rec-
ommendations. In this section, we propose three fairness properties
an election mechanism should satisfy to make the recommenda-
tions fairly representative: (a) Equality of Voice, (b) Proportional
Representation, and (c) Anti-Plurality.
3.1 Equality of Voice
Most of the top-K recommendations in use today (e.g., ‘Most Viewed
Stories’ in news websites like nytimes.com) can be intuitively cat-
egorized as a particular type of electoral systems – ‘Weighted Vot-
ing’ [41] (also known as ‘Plural Voting’ [28]), where a single voter
can vote for any number of candidates and that too multiple times.
The candidates getting maximum votes are selected for recommen-
dation (e.g., the stories getting maximum views regardless of users
reading multiple stories or reading the same story multiple times).
We saw earlier that there is a large variety in the activity levels of
3
different users. Thus, effectively a hyper-active user can influence
the election much more than a lesser-active user.
To avoid this issue, we propose that the item (s)election algorithm
should treat all website users (i.e., all voters) similarly, where no user
is more privileged or discriminated to determine the set of winners. In
social choice, this property is known as Anonymity Criterion [37],
and intuitively termed as ‘one person one vote’. One way to achieve
this is to require the voters to specify their preferences over a set of
candidates. In the recommendation context, we can compute these
preference rankings based on the activities of the users (e.g., a user
may post her highly preferred topic more than a lesser preferred
topic). In addition, to give equal voice to the silent (i.e., less active)
users, we also need to infer their ranked choices over candidate
items. Fortunately, we can utilize the long lines of works in person-
alized recommendations for inferring different user’s personalized
preferences towards different items (detailed in the next section).
Let σi (j) denote the preference rank user i gives to item j (where
σi (j) = 1 denotes that j is the most preferred item to i). βi =
{σi (j) ∀j ∈ C} denotes the preference ranking (i.e., ranked ballot)
of the user i , whereC = {c1, c2, ..., cm } is the set of candidate items.
Then, the top-K recommendation can be formally expressed as the
4-tuple (C, P , f ,K), where P = {β1, β2, ..., βn } is the preference
rankings from all users, and the selection algorithm is a function
f : C, P →W which selects the set of K winner itemsW for rec-
ommendation from the candidate set C (i.e.,W ⊆ C) using the
preference rankings P .
3.2 Proportional Representation
Even after considering everyone’s preferences, due to the presence
of too many candidate items, users’ choices get split across many
irrelevant alternatives [1]. Furthermore, some alternatives may be
very similar to each other (e.g., two hashtags or news stories refer-
ring to the same event), and there the vote splitting can be sharper.
Consequently, items preferred by only a small number of users may
end up being selected despite being disliked by the majority.
To illustrate this point, let us consider a toy example in Table 1,
depicting a 2-winner election with 5 candidate items and 100 voters
who rank them according to their choices. Assume that items 1 and
2 belong to a category C1, and items 3 and 4 belong to another cat-
egory C2. Further assume that there is another item 5 representing
an extreme opinion. We can see that although 39% of the voters are
interested in each of C1 and C2, due to splitting of votes (especially
between items 3 and 4), the extreme item 5 can win in a plurality
vote2, along with item 1. This is despite item 5 being disliked by
78% voters who have put it as their last choice. To alleviate the
problems illustrated above, we consider two fairness criteria: (i)
proportionality for solid coalitions, and (ii) Anti-plurality.
Proportionality for solid coalitions
We propose that in a fair top-K recommendation, the diversity of
opinions in the user population should be proportionally represented
in the recommended items. To formalize proportional representation,
we consider the criterion of proportionality for solid coalitions [13].
In social choice, a solid coalition for a set of candidates C ′ ⊆ C is
defined as a set of voters V ′ who all rank every candidate in C ′
higher than any candidate outside of C ′. The proportionality for
2where the candidates getting most first choice votes are (s)elected.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Category
Item 1 30 20 30 17 3 C1
Item 2 9 30 15 38 8 C1
Item 3 20 20 25 30 5 C2
Item 4 19 30 30 15 6 C2
Item 5 22 0 0 0 78 Extreme
Table 1: How 5 candidate items are present across different
ranked choices of 100 users.
solid coalitions criterion requires that if V ′ has at least q · nK+1
voters, then the set of winning candidatesW should contain at least
q candidates from C ′ (where q ∈ N, n = |P | and K = |W |).
In the context of crowdsourced recommendations, different groups
of users may prefer a group of items (e.g., hashtags or news) more
than other items. Then, the proportional representation criteria
means that if a set of items is preferred by a group of users who
represent a fraction q · 1K+1 of the population, then at least q items
from this set should be selected. The quantity ⌊ nK+1 ⌋ + 1 is known
as Droop Quota [12]. In Table 1, the Droop Quota is 34 and hence, to
satisfy proportional representation, a recommendation algorithm
should select one item each from the categories C1 and C2.
3.3 Anti-plurality
In social choice theory, the Majority Loser Criterion [46] was pro-
posed to evaluate single-winner elections, which requires that if a
majority of voters prefer every other candidate over a given can-
didate, then that candidate should not be elected. We extend this
criterion to top-K recommendations (and implicitly to multi-winner
elections), where the anti-plurality property intuitively mandates
that no item disliked by a majority of the users should be rec-
ommended. We can formalize this criterion by requiring that no
candidate item among the bottom x percentile of the ranked choices
for majority of the voters should be selected, where x is a parame-
ter of the definition. For example, any recommendation algorithm
satisfying anti-plurality will not select Item 5 in Table 1 because it
is the last choice for 78% of the users.
4 FAIR TOP-K RECOMMENDATIONWITH
EQUALITY OF VOICE
Several electoral mechanisms have been proposed for multi-winner
elections, which include Plurality Voting, k-Borda, Chamberlain-
Courant, Monroe or Approval Voting [15]. Subsequent researchworks
have investigated different fairness criteria that these mechanisms
satisfy [14, 37]. In this paper, we consider a particular electoral
mechanism, Single Transferable Vote (STV), that satisfies two fairness
criteria we described in Section 3 – proportional representation and
anti-plurality3, and apply it in the context of crowdsourced top-K
recommendations.
4.1 Single Transferable Vote (STV)
STV considers the ranked choices of all voters, and then executes a
series of iterations, until it finds K winners. Algorithm 1 presents
the pseudocode of the STV procedure. Consider the example in
Table 1 with K = 2. Here, Droop Quota (dq) is 34; hence there is no
winner in the first iteration. Item 2 gets eliminated transferring all 9
3For brevity, we skip the comparison of STVwith all other electoral methods. Interested
readers are referred to [14] to see how STV compares with other methods across
different fairness properties.
4
Input : Candidate list C , Preference rankings P ,K
Output : Set of K winners (W )
W = Φ ; ▷ Start with an empty winner set
dq = ⌊ |P |K+1 ⌋ + 1 ; ▷ Droop quota
while |W | < K do
using P, assign votes to the first choice candidates ;
if a candidate j has votes ≥ dq then
W =W ∪ {j} ; ▷ Add j to the winner set
remove dq voters from P who rank j first ;
transfer j’s surplus votes to the next preference of the
corresponding voters ;
remove j from all voters’ preference rankings ;
else
eliminate a candidate c with the smallest tally ;
redistribute c’s votes to its voters’ next preferences ;
end
end Algorithm 1: Single Transferable Vote (STV)
votes to Item 1 (assuming Item 1 to be those voters’ second choices).
In the second iteration, Item 1 wins and transfers excess 5 votes to
Item 3 or Item 4 (lets assume Item 4). In the third iteration, Item 3
gets eliminated, transferring all its votes to Item 4. Finally, in the
fourth iteration, Item 4 wins resulting inW = {Item 1, Item 4}. The
worst case time complexity of STV isO(n ·m · (m−K)) where there
aren voters andm candidates. However, some performance speedup
is possible over the vanilla algorithm presented in Algorithm 1.
By transferring votes to the preferred candidates beyond first
choice, STV achieves proportional representation, where every se-
lected candidate gets about 1K+1 fraction of electorate support [13].
Similarly, for candidates disliked by a majority of the users, unless
they are preferred by at least 1K+1 fraction of all users, STV will
not include them in the winner list, thus satisfying anti-plurality.
More importantly, STV has been proved to be resistant to strategic
voting, where determining a preference that will elect a favored can-
didate is NP-complete [4]. Thus, STV would make it much harder
for malicious actors to manipulate the selection of items for rec-
ommendation. For example, consider the case of trending topic
selection. Essentially, it would require at least nK+1 compromised or
bot accounts (which is a very large number considering n = number
of all Twitter users and K = 10) to make one topic trending.
Although, STV satisfies the fairness properties required in crowd-
sourced item selection, it considers the ranked choice over all candi-
dates for every user4, which gives rise to the following two problems
that hinder the applicability of STV in recommending items:
(i) A large majority of the users do not vote during an election, and
(ii) Even for the users who participate, it is not possible to get the
ranked choice over all candidate items (because they may vote for
only a few candidates during an election).
Next, we propose approaches to circumvent these two issues, en-
abling us to guarantee equality of voice to everyone (including silent
users) and apply STV for selecting items in top-K recommendations.
4Though it is technically possible to apply STV with incomplete preference rankings,
STV guarantees strategyproofness only when the preferences are complete [4].
4.2 Getting preference rankings of all users
Intuitively, we can think of getting the ranked choices of a user u as
determining how interested u is in different candidate items. Then,
the problem gets mapped to inferring user interests in personalized
item recommendations, and there is a large body of works on the
same, which can be categorized into two broad classes: content
based methods [24] and collaborative filtering [22]. We first at-
tempt to get the personalized ranked choices of Adressa readers, by
applying a collaborative filtering approach based on Non-negative
Matrix Factorization (NMF), as described next.
Inferring preferences for Adressa readers
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the Adressa dataset contains infor-
mation about the time different readers spent on different news
stories. We first convert this implicit feedback to explicit ratings
by normalizing with respect to both users’ reading habits and the
length of different articles. If a user u spent vu,i time reading news
story i , then we compute the normalized view duration nvu,i as
nvu,i =
vu,i
µi
(1)
where µi is the average time spent by all users reading story i . Note
that this normalization removes the bias of having possibly longer
view duration for lengthier articles.
Once nvu,i values are computed for different stories for the user
u, we divide them into 5 quantiles and convert them into ratings.
For example, the top 20 percentile nvu,i values are converted to
rating 5, the next 20 percentile values to rating 4, and so on. We
apply this mapping to every user-news interaction and end up with
a user-news rating matrix R where Ru,i denotes the rating of news
story i computed for user u.
Matrix factorization approaches map both users and news stories
into a joint latent feature space of Z dimensions such that the
interaction between the users and the news stories are modeled as
inner products in that space. For example, if the vectors xu and yi
denote the latent feature vectors for user u and news story i , then
the estimated rating rˆu,i for a given user u and a story i is given by
the scalar product:
rˆu,i = x
T
u · yi (2)
The challenge then is to find the latent feature vectors by observ-
ing the existing ratings. Multiple approaches have been proposed
to efficiently optimize the following objective [22]
min
∑
(u,i)∈κ
(ru,i − rˆu,i )2 + λ(| |xu | |2 + | |yi | |2) (3)
where κ is set of user-news pairs for which the ratings are known.
In this paper, we apply the Non-negative Matrix Factorization
approach proposed by Luo et al. [25] which solves Equation (3) by
using stochastic gradient descent with non-negativity constraints
on the feature values. Once we get the feature vectors for different
users and news stories, then the ratings can be predicted even for
the unread stories. Thereafter, we compute preference ranking for
the users based on the predicted and actual ratings (with actual
ratings getting precedence and ties being broken randomly).
Inferring preferences for Twitter users
To infer Twitter users’ preferences, we considered both content
based recommendation and collaborative filtering:
(i) Compute content based similarity between a user u and hashtag
5
h by considering the set of all tweets posted by u and the set of
tweets containing h. However, we found that most users do not
post enough tweets, and thus we can not accurately compute the
content based similarity between a user and the candidate hashtags.
(ii) As there is no explicit rating available, we tried to apply a collab-
orative filtering based approach to compute personalized ranking
using implicit feedback like favoring or retweeting [35]. However,
two independence assumptions in such approaches – items are
independent of each other and the users act independently – do
not hold in the context of Twitter. Hashtags are often related [36],
and Twitter users often influence other users. Further, the amount
of implicit feedback is very low (in our dataset, only 21% tweets
get any retweets, or likes or favorites) and the set of hashtags are
constantly changing. Hence, the collaborative filtering approaches
could not be applied in this context.
To circumvent these difficulties, we utilize prior works involv-
ing topical experts on Twitter [5, 17, 48]. Using the ‘List’ feature
in Twitter, users can create named groups of people they follow.
By giving meaningful names to the lists created, they implicitly
describe the members of such groups. Ghosh et al. [17] gathered
these list information from a large number of Twitter users, and
identified thousands of topical experts on Twitter, where the topics
are very fine-grained. Then, both Bhattacharya et al. [5] and Zafar
et al. [48] utilized these topical experts to infer interest of a particu-
lar user as well as topic of a particular hashtag. The basic intuition
of [5] is that if a user is following multiple experts in some area,
then he is likely to be interested in that area. Similarly, if multiple
topical experts are posting some hashtag, then the probability that
the hashtag belongs to that topic is very high [48].
Implementing the approaches proposed in [5] and [48], for a user
u, we infer an interest vector Iu considering the experts u follows,
and similarly, we compute a topic vector Th for a hashtag h by
taking into account the experts tweeting h. Then, for every user u,
we normalize the interest topics in Iu such that every entry in Iu lies
between 0 and 1, and all entries sum to 1. Similarly, for every hashtag
h, we calculate the tf-idf scores over the topics in Th . We repeat
this process for every user and every candidate hashtag during
an election. Finally, we compute the preference scores between all
users and all candidate hashtags as
A = U ×T × HT (4)
where An×m is the User-Hashtag Affinity Matrix with Av,h denot-
ing affinity between user u and hashtag h;Un×t is the User-Interest
Matrix with Uu, j representing normalized interest of u in some
interest topic j; Tt×t is the Interest-Topic Similarity Matrix, Ti, j
representing the similarity between two topics i and j (we compute
Ti, j as the Jaccard Similarity between the set of experts in topic
i and j respectively). Finally, Hm×t is the Hashtag-Topic Matrix
where Hh, j denotes tf-idf of topic j in hashtag h.
Using A computed above, we can get the preference ranking
of any user over the candidate hashtags. If a user u participates
in an election and votes for tag h, then h is considered as the top
choice in u’s preference ranking and other ranked positions are
shifted accordingly. If a user votes for k hashtags, top k positions are
assigned to these k candidates according to their usage frequency.
Accuracy of the preference inference
For inferring the preferences of Adressa readers, we attempted an-
other technique based on Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [33].
Comparing the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) between the
actual ratings and ratings inferred by both SVD and NMF based
approaches, we found that the NMF based approach (RMSE: 0.87)
works better than the SVD based approach (RMSE: 0.97).
In Twitter, there is no ground truth rating or ranking. Hence, to
check the accuracy of the inference of Twitter users’ preference
rankings, we asked 10 volunteers (who are active Twitter users)
to rank 10 hashtags during 15 election cycles. Then, we compute
their preference ranking using our approach and checked Kendall’s
rank correlation coefficient τ [20] between the inferred and actual
rankings for every volunteer. We find the average τ value to be
0.702 (compared to 0.317 for random ordering), which suggests that
our method can infer the ranked choices of users reasonably well.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed ap-
proaches in selecting items for recommendation. For that, in Twitter,
we consider every 15 minute intervals throughout the month of
July, 2017 as election cycles. During any election, from the large
set of available hashtags, we select 1,000 candidate hashtags which
experience highest jump in usage during that election cycle (com-
pared to their usage in the previous cycle). While computing the
preference rankings of Twitter users, due to Twitter API rate limits,
it is not possible to infer ranked choice for everyone. We take 2%
random sample from the 15 million Twitter users in our dataset
(resulting in a large sample of 300K users)5, and gather the ranked
choices of all of them (and of no other) over the 1,000 candidates.
For the Adressa dataset, we consider every day during February
and March, 2017 as election cycles. We select as candidates top
1,000 stories based on the number of users clicking on them. Then,
we compute the preference rankings of all users in our dataset over
the candidates. After getting the preference rankings of the users,
we apply two methods:
(i) Consider the preference rankings, and select K items which are
the first choice for most users. We denote this method as PLV*,
because this is an extension of Plurality Voting described next.
(ii) Run STV using the preference rankings and select the winners
of the election. Following the convention used for PLV*, in this
section, we denote STV as STV* to reflect the fact that the ranked
choices of everyone have been considered, not only the active users.
Next, we describe the baselines we compare PLV* and STV* against.
5.1 Baseline approaches
In addition to the preference rankings, we also gather the votes
given by the users participating in an election cycle. Then, using
the data, we apply the following approaches to select the winners.
i. Weighted Voting (WV) : Here, K candidates getting maximum
votes win the election regardless of who voted for them and how
5The idea of ‘random voting’ is not new. Getting everyone to vote in an election is often
impractical or too costly. Dating back to ancient Athenian democracy, philosophers
including Aristotle argued for selecting a large random sample of voters and then
mandating them to vote during an election [19]. More recently, Chaum [10] proposed
a technique to hold random elections. Fishkin et al. [16] proposed an alternate ‘De-
liberative Polling’, where the idea is to select a random sample of voters, give them
proper information, ask them to discuss issues and then consider only their votes.
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Figure 2: Heatmaps depicting the Jaccard Coefficients between different methods for selecting (a) trending topics in Twitter,
and (b) most popular news in Adressa. (c) Average ranked choices and (d) Percentile choices for the trending topics selected
by different methods throughout July, 2017.
many times one user voted. Hence, it is vulnerable to manipulation
by hyper-active users.
ii. Plurality Voting (PLV) : Plurality Voting6, or Single Non-
Transferable Vote (SNTV), considers only one vote from a partici-
pating user. So, if a particular user voted multiple times, we count
only one vote for the candidate she voted the most (with randomly
breaking ties). Then, K candidates with maximum votes win.
iii. Twitter Trending Topics (TT) : We are not privy to the ex-
act algorithm Twitter employs to select the set of trending topics
during an election cycle. Therefore, we consider the algorithm as
black-box and compare the hashtags selected by the methods with
the hashtags declared as trending by Twitter.
5.2 Quantifying pairwise overlaps
We first investigate whether these different methods pick very dif-
ferent items or they end up selecting same items during an election.
To check that, we gather all the items (i.e., hashtags and news sto-
ries) selected by each of the methods, and then compute pairwise
overlaps between them. Figure 2(a) shows the heatmap of Jaccard
coefficient between different methods, where Jaccard coefficient
between methods i and j is measured as |Si∩Sj ||Si∪Sj | , where Si is the set
of items selected by method i throughout all election cycles.
We see from Figure 2(a) that there is 50% overlap between the
trending hashtags selected by PLV* and STV*. TT has around 35%
overlap with PLV. There is little overlap between hashtags selected
by other methods. Similarly, for Adressa dataset (Figure 2(b)), we
see around 45% overlap between the news stories selected by PLV*
and STV*. The rest of the methods do not have much overlap.
Takeaway: Different methods select mostly different items during
election cycles. We only see some common items being selected by
our two proposed approaches: PLV* and STV*, possibly because
both consider the top preferences of all users. Interestingly, actual
Twitter Trending Topics (TT) has the highest overlap with the tags
selected by Plurality Voting (PLV). Thus, the Twitter algorithm can
be conceptualized as running plurality-based elections.
5.3 Comparing ranked choices of users
Different users have different interests, and thus their ranked choices
over different candidate items can vary considerably. We now inves-
tigate how different election methods capture the choices of these
users. Figure 2(c) shows, on average, how the hashtags selected
by different methods represent different ranked choices of Twitter
6Not to be confused with ‘Plural Voting’, which is a variant of ‘Weighted Voting’.
users. Figure 2(d) presents the user choices in different percentile
bins. We can observe in both Figure 2(c) and Figure 2(d) that the
STV* selected tags correspond to top 10 percentile choices for a
majority of users. While PLV* captures users’ top choices to some
extent, both PLV and TT appeal very differently to different voters.
Finally, WV tends to pick tags which represent top choices of only
a few voters and bottom choices for a majority of the voters.
Takeaway: STV* consistently selects tags that are the top prefer-
ences for all voters; whereas other methods capture both top and
bottom preferences, with WV performing the worst. Few actual
trends selected by Twitter are least preferred by a lot of voters. We
see similar result for the Adressa news data as well.
5.4 Comparing desirable fairness properties
We now compare different methods along the desirable fairness
properties identified in Section 3. WV does not satisfy ‘Equality of
Voice’ because effectively a voter voting multiple times exerts more
power than a voter voting once during an election. PLV considers
one vote per participating voter; however, it does not consider votes
of the silent users. Our proposed PLV* and STV* both guarantee
voice equality by giving all users an equal chance to participate in
the item selection process. Regarding the other two properties, we
empirically observe to what extent the methods satisfy them.
5.4.1 User Satisfaction Index.
The proportional representation criterion requires that if a candi-
date is preferred by 1K+1 fraction of the users, it should be selected,
and only STV* theoretically satisfies this criterion. An alternate
way to consider representation is from users’ perspective. We pro-
pose a user satisfaction criterion which requires that every user
should have at least one elected candidate from her top choices.
Formally, we consider a user to be satisfied if at least one of its top
10 choices is selected by a method during an election. Then, User
Satisfaction Index is measured as the fraction of users who are sat-
isfied by a method. Figure 3(a) shows the average User Satisfaction
Index for different methods to compute Twitter trends, and we see
that both PLV* and STV* are able to satisfy more than 70% of the
users; whereas, the other methods cannot satisfy even 50% users.
We see similar results for Adressa news dataset as well (Figure 3(b)).
5.4.2 Anti-plurality Index.
The notion of anti-plurality captures whether a method selects
items that are disliked by most of the users. We consider a item i to
be disliked by a user u if t appears among v’s bottom 10 percentile
choices. Then for every such i , we compute what percentage of
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Figure 3: User Satisfaction Index of different methods for computing (a) Twitter Trends, and (b) Most Popular Adressa News.
Anti-Plurality Index of different methods for computing (c) Twitter Trends, and (d) Most Popular Adressa News.
users dislike i and aggregate this over all the items selected by
different methods. Figure 3(c) and Figure 3(d) shows the average
Anti-plurality Index for all methods of selecting Twitter Trends and
Most Popular Adressa News. We can see in Figure 3(c) that both
STV* and PLV* select almost no tags which are disliked by any of
the users. On the other hand, WV picks tags which, on average,
are disliked by 25% users. For both PLV and TT, the selected tags
are disliked by around 5% of all users. Similarly, we can see in
Figure 3(d) that STV* has the lowest anti-plurality value (less than
5%) while stories selected by WV are disliked by 25% of users.
Specific to Twitter, we observe that there were some extremist
tags (e.g., #exterminate_syrians, #IslamIsTheProblem), spammy
tags (e.g., #houstonfollowtrain, #InternationalEscorts) or politically
biased tags (e.g., #fakeNewsCNN, #IdiotTrump) which were disliked
by more than 90% users, yet got selected by WV or PLV due to the
presence of some hyper-active user groups. However, STV* and
PLV* did not select any of such hashtags.
5.5 Demographic bias and
under-representation in selected topics
In our earlier work [9], we found that most of the Twitter trends
are promoted by users whose demographics vary significantly from
Twitter’s overall population. Next, we check whether the voting
methods considered in this paper amplify or reduce these demo-
graphic biases. We use the demographic information of Twitter
users as obtained in [9]. Then, demographic bias of tag i is com-
puted as the euclidean distance between the demographics di of
the people tweeting on i and the reference demographics dr of the
Twitter population in the US [9]: Biasi = | |di −dr | |. The higher the
score Biasi , more biased are the users using the tag i .
Figure 4(a) shows the average bias across the tags selected by dif-
ferent methods throughout all election cycles. We see in Figure 4(a)
that the tags selected by WV are most gender, racially and age
biased. On the other hand, STV* selects tags that are least biased.
We further observe that considering the preferences of the silent
users helps reducing the bias as the average bias of tags selected by
PLV* is lower than the average bias of PLV selected tags.
We next consider the under-representation of different socially
salient groups among the users of the tags selected by different
methods (where we consider a group i to be under-represented if the
fraction of i among the trend users is < 80% of the fraction of i in the
overall population [9]). Figure 4(b) shows the under-representation
of men and women. In almost all the methods, women are under-
represented for over 40% of the selected tags; whereas, men are
under-represented for only around 15% of the tags. However, in
the tags selected by STV*, although under-representation of men
slightly increases, under-representation of women greatly reduces,
having almost equal under-representation of both gender groups.
Figure 4(c) shows the under-representation of different racial
groups: Whites, Blacks and Asians. Even though none of the meth-
ods achieve similar under-representation of all three racial groups,
STV* reduces the under-representation of Blacks and Asians con-
siderably, while keeping the under-representation of Whites similar
to other methods. We observe similar trends for age groups where
under-representation of Mid-Aged and Adolescents decrease in the
tags selected by STV*. The detailed result is omitted for brevity.
How does considering preference rankings reduce
demographic bias?
The reduction in demographic bias and under-representation of dif-
ferent social groups among STV* selected tags is surprising because
the method has not explicitly taken into account the preference
rankings of voters belonging to different demographic groups. We
investigate the reason by considering the 100 most and 100 least
biased tags along all three demographic dimensions – gender, race
and age, and then by checking how they rank in different voters’
preference rankings. Figure 5 clearly shows that highly biased tags
rank low in most of the voter choices. On the other hand, tags
with low bias tend to be ranked higher by most of the voters. This
interesting observation explains why methods like PLV* or STV*
which relies on preference rankings of all the voters tend to select
tags with low bias as compared to other methods like WV or TT
which only consider votes by the active users.
6 RELATEDWORKS
In this section, we briefly review the related works along two di-
mensions: top-K item recommendations, and fairness in algorithmic
decision making systems.
Top-K recommendations: Top-K item recommendations is tra-
ditionally associated with personalized recommendation which
attempts to find K items a particular user would be mostly inter-
ested in [11]. In content-based recommendations, a user profile is
generated based on what she likes or dislikes, and then similar con-
tent is identified depending on her past likes [34]. In collaborative
filtering, the preference of a particular user can be inferred based on
their similarity to other users [22]. However, the recommendation
scenario we are considering here is non-personalized, where the
same K items are recommended to everyone. In fact, the problemwe
are focusing on is how to fairly aggregate personalized preferences
of all users of a website.
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Figure 4: (a) Demographic bias, (b) Gender and (c) Racial under-representation in tags selected by different methods.
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Figure 5: Ranked choices of voters for 100 hashtags most biased and least biased along (a) gender, (b) race and (c) age.
Bringing fairness in algorithmic decisions: Multiple recent
works have focused on biases and unfairness in algorithmic de-
cision making [7, 39, 49]. Yao et al. [47] proposed a few fairness
notions for personalized recommendations. Zehlike et al. [50] intro-
duced fairness in top-k ranking problem through utility based multi-
objective formulation. Burke [6] and Chakraborty et al. [8] argued
for preserving fairness of consumers (users) as well as suppliers
(item producers) in two-sided matching markets. Complementary
to earlier efforts, in this paper, we present the notions of fairness
in crowdsourced non-personalized recommendations, and utilize
electoral mechanisms to satisfy them in practice.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Recently, there has been a lot of debate and concerns regarding
the bias in algorithms operating over big crowd-sourced data. In
this paper, by conceptualizing crowdsourced recommendation as
a multi-winner election, we showed that the bias originates from
the unfairness in the electoral process. Then, utilizing long lines of
works in social choice theory, we established the fairness proper-
ties desired in crowdsourced selections, and identified a particular
mechanism STVwhich satisfies most of these properties. As a result,
extensive evaluation over two real-world datasets shows that STV
can reduce unfairness and bias in crowdsourced recommendations.
Moreover, STV can also resist strategic manipulation by requiring a
lot of user support behind potential candidates for recommendation,
thereby making it difficult for spammers, bots, or trend hijackers
to influence the recommendation process.
There are multiple research directions we want to explore in
future. First, our proposed approach can potentially be applied in
personalized news recommendation scenario which combine both
user choices and the news trends among the crowds (e.g., Google
News [23]). In such context, at the first level, the candidate sto-
ries for recommendation can be selected by standard personalized
recommendation algorithms which consider a particular user’s in-
terest. Then, an election method like STV can be applied to take into
account the crowd choices for electing news stories to recommend
to the user. Second, in this work, we conceptualized item (s)election
to happen at every fixed intervals; however, there is a streaming
component in recommendations like Trending Topics [26] (with oc-
casional burstiness in user activities [21]). Regular election methods
are not designed to tackle such scenarios, and we plan to develop
mechanisms to handle continuous elections, while simultaneously
satisfying the desired fairness properties.
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